I. INTRODUCTION
Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a well-accepted ubiquitous serial interface. It is commonly used to connect peripheral devices such as keyboards, mice, cell phones, printers, scanner, Mass Storage Devices (MSD), etc. to a host Personal Computer (PC). The high availability, high data transfer rate and ease of connectivity are primary advantages of USB. However, at an application level, MSD's suffer from significant security weaknesses such as (1) an unauthorized user could easily read or steal confidential information as the information is stored in plaintext form, and (2) an attacker could intercept all the information sent over the bus as the channel between device and the host computer USB port can be open to the attacker (e.g. physical, virus or malware). User authentication and session key agreement are designed in such a way that they can resolve the aforementioned difficulties.
Many authors have proposed authentication schemes. In 2004, Ku and Chen [1] proposed an authentication scheme which was solely based on passwords, but Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [2] found that Ku and Chen's scheme [1] was vulnerable to the parallel session attack and so they proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. In 2010, Yang, Wu and Chiu [3] also proposed a password based protocol for USB MSDs. Research then focused on complementing passwords with user biometrics [4] to offer a further factor to the authentication protocol in order to provide improved security. In 2013, Lee, Chen and Wu [5] proposed a biometric based three-factor authentication protocol for USB MSDs. However, in 2014, He et al. [6] showed that Lee, Chen and Wu's scheme [5] could not resist the password guessing attack, the Denial of Service (DoS) attack and the replay attack, so He et al. [6] proposed a biometrics based three-factor security protocol for USB MSDs. In 2015, Giri et al. [7] also proposed an authentication scheme for USB MSDs using biometrics and password protection, where after performing mutual authentication, a session key was established to encrypt user's data.
This research has identified that there are two drawbacks in the previously presented schemes, (1) each time a user sends a request to the authentication server to decrypt a stored file the server sends the same part of the key. If an authorized user stores that part of the key then it is no longer needed to send a subsequent request to the server to obtain the same part of key at a later date. However, in security protocols for consumer USB MSDs it is required to authenticate each and every time a user wants to store and retrieve the file; (2) if an authorized user wishes to retrieve a stored encrypted file within the same login session as when the file was originally stored into the memory of USB device, then the user has to perform all the authentication steps (mainly login phase) which unfortunately increases the computational and communication costs, and reduces device usability.
This research presents a system architecture for creating a Three-factor Security Protocol (TSP), where authorized users can store their files in encrypted form and not only can retrieve the original file in the current session but additionally in subsequent sessions after performing the authentication procedure respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the required mathematical concepts. Section III introduce the proposed scheme by describing the system architecture. Section IV presents the authentication scheme proposed in this work and the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed in Section V. Section VI presents the performance evaluation and Section VII concludes the paper. TABLE I shows the nomenclature that is used throughout the paper. 
The symmetric key encryption/decryption algorithm also follows the property of collision resistance as described in 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section presents the details of the system architecture of the proposed scheme.
At first, user U i registers with an authentication server, AS, in order to request authorized access to the USB MSD as shown in Fig. 1(a) . AS has the responsibility to verify the legitimacy of U i when U i wishes to read or write a file to a storage device via the USB interface. U i enters their identity, password and biometric parameters to verify legitimacy. Fig.  1(b) shows the communication procedure when U i wants to store a new file into the USB MSD in an encrypted form or wants to decrypt an already stored encrypted file in the USB device. This research has considered two conditions (1) U i can store a new file in an encrypted form after performing mutual authentication between U i and AS in session S i and can decrypt the newly stored encrypted file within the session S i after obtaining permission from AS, (2) U i can decrypt the stored encrypted file within a different session, S j , after performing mutual authentication between U i and AS. Moreover in this proposed system architecture, the authentication plays a vital role whenever the users try to store/extract a file to/from their USB MSD, each and every time the users need to be authenticated to AS. 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME FROM THIS RESEARCH
The proposed scheme consists of (1) registration phase, (2) authentication with file encryption and decryption phase in current session, (3) authentication with file decryption phase in different session and (4) 
If the equality fails then the device rejects U i ; otherwise the device executes the next step.
2) The USB MSD generates random number i  , and
and F i are the first r number of bits of the file, the current timestamp of U i and index or identity of the file respectively. Finally, message 1 , , , , ,
is sent to AS. 
. If the equality does not hold, AS rejects the message; otherwise AS generates random number β i and computes
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AS then sends the message 2 , , , ,
If the equality fails then U i terminates the session; otherwise U i selects a suitable file name F name for the file and stores the encrypted file as
the memory of the USB MSD, where (n-r) bits are the remaining bits of the file. Note that if U i maintains a database for the file plus key combinations then U i has to also communicate with AS to extract the first r bits of the file. If r or (n-r) bits are larger than key size k then U i breaks r or (n-r) bits into blocks of size equal to the key size k (here 128 bits) and encrypt each block with the counter (CTR) mode [10] of operation to produce the corresponding ciphertext. Plaintext can be retrieved by the same procedure reversely. When U i wants to decrypt that encrypted file from the USB MSD in the current session, the following steps are executed between U i and AS: 
rejects the message, otherwise U i obtains the plaintext of the file by decoding file by computing
C. Authentication with File Decryption Phase in a Different Session
When U i wants to decrypt the stored encrypted file from the USB MSD in a different session, the following steps are executed between U i and AS: 1) After checking the provided password pw i , identity ID i and biometric parameter ' i B of U i as described in IV.B, the USB MSD generates random number i  and then computes ˆ( || || || || ) 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME
The formal security analysis of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is presented in this section. This security analysis uses the formal security analysis under the generic group model of cryptography. In the following, this work defines random oracles for the formal security analysis of the proposed scheme:
 OracleH is a random oracle which maintains a tuple 
, , C k M is present in its tuple; otherwise returns two random numbers 6 r and 7 r from key space.
Then it stores new entry 6 7 , , C r r in its tuple.
Theorem 1:
Under the assumption that   h  and ENC/DEC act as random oracles, the proposed scheme derived from this Three-factor Security Protocol (TSP) work is then provably secure against an adversary A for deriving the secret key x of an authentication server AS after obtaining the stored information into the memory of the MSD, and capturing the login message and the reply messages of the authentication plus file encryption plus file retrieval phase during communication between U i and AS in the current session as well as in a different session.
Proof 1: Assume that A has the ability to derive the secret key x of AS, and the MSD of U i is lost or stolen. Thus, A can extract the stored parameters , , ,
A C K G from the memory of the MSD of i U by power monitoring [11] , [12] . A also traps the login message MSG1, the reply messages MSG2, 
then the advantage is given by:
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to the OracleH oracle and the number of queries qDEC made by OracleSK DEC . Again, the proposed scheme is said to be provably secure against A deriving the session key SK i between U i and AS if 
A. Discussion of Presented Theorems
Theorem 2 demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing attack.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure against the session key recovery attack, because without knowing random numbers α, β (for current session), and δ, γ (for a different session) then A cannot compute the session key SK. In the proposed scheme, all communicating messages depend on random numbers and the timestamp. So, all the communication messages are guaranteed to be different for every session. Thus, A cannot mount a replay attack on this proposed scheme. In this proposed scheme, A cannot mount a forgery attack without knowing secret password i pw of U i , the secret key x of the server AS and random numbers generated by U i and AS respectively. Theorems 1 and 2 show that the secret information of the authentication server and the user are secure from A. Thus, it is infeasible to mount a forgery attack on this proposed scheme.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SCHEME
This section compares the performance of the proposed scheme with related schemes in the literature [1] - [3] , [5] , [6] . The login and authentication phases for both file encryption and file decryption of the proposed scheme have been compared with the related existing schemes in the literature [1] - [3] , [5] , [6] because these phases are commonly used.
TABLE II presents the communication (overhead) and storage costs of this work compared to the literature. It can be seen that the communication cost of this work is the same for data encryption in the literature, but has a significant advantage in the data decryption within the current session as was the objective of this work. The storage cost of this work is also comparable to the literature.
TABLE III verifies the types of attacks that are considered, the key management and the mutual authentication that the literature uses compared to this work. 
. It can be seen that yes [14] no no no no Server masquerading attack yes [14] yes [14] yes [15] no no no Insider attack no no no no no no Off-line password guessing attack yes [14] yes [14] no yes [6] no no Inefficient login phase yes [14] yes [14] yes no no no Denial of service (DoS ) attack yes [14] yes [14] no yes [6] [3] , [5] , [6] . Low communication overhead, low storage cost, low computational cost and resistance of all possible attacks indicate that the proposed scheme provides an efficient security protocol offering a practical solution for enhanced security of mass market USB MSD.
VII. CONCLUSION
An efficient mutual authentication protocol has been presented to encrypt files in a Universal Serial Bus (USB) Mass Storage Device (MSD) enabling secure and usable "USB memory sticks." This paper has contributed a novel concept to the current state of the art in biometric security algorithms by defending against security attacks and improving device usability across different sessions. Moreover, the paper has formally proved that the proposed protocol can withstand relevant security weaknesses. A performance comparison has also been made with the literature to confirm that the proposed scheme achieves a significantly lower computation cost and communication cost than other related schemes. The overall efficiency demonstrates that USB based MSDs with biometric security sensors can be implemented in order to provide significant security and usability for the consumer and beyond.
